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Abstract 
Using a gift exchange experiment, we show that the ability of reciprocity to overcome incentive problems 
inherent in principal-agent settings is greatly reduced when the agent’s effort is distorted by random 
shocks and transmitted imperfectly to the principal. Specifically, we find that gift exchange contracts 
without shocks encourage effort and wages well above standard predictions. However, the introduction of 
random shocks reduces wages and effort, regardless of whether the shocks can be observed by the 
principal. Moreover, the introduction of shocks significantly reduces the probability of fulfilling the 
contract by the agent, the payoff of the principal, and total welfare. Therefore, our findings demonstrate 
that random shocks place an important bound on the ability of gift exchange to overcome principal-agent 
problems.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper addresses two related sources of inefficiency that can arise in principal-agent 
relationships. First, a large literature notes that if the agent’s effort is signaled imperfectly to the principal 
and monitoring is expensive or impossible, then it may be impossible to write a first-best contract, since 
the observed outcomes are not perfectly correlated with the agent’s actions.1 Second, if contracts are not 
exogenously enforceable or verifiable, endogenous enforcement through incentive compatibility 
requirements generally incentivizes agents to provide suboptimal levels of effort.
2
 These two problems 
are related because it is impossible to exogenously enforce a contract (through legal or other institutions) 
which specifies effort requirements when effort is unobservable. 
The unobservable effort problem is a common one for firms, as there are many types of tasks in 
which effort is positively correlated with observable outcomes, but these outcomes are also a function of 
random shocks (such as profits, number of sales, etc.). For example, the quantity of sales made by 
regional salespeople reflects both their effort and local demand fluctuations, where the latter are 
ostensibly random and difficult to observe. Hence, an employee can put in very little effort but perform 
well because of luck. Under these conditions, what is fair remuneration?
3
 Should the employee be 
punished for lack of effort or rewarded for a good performance which predominantly came from luck? On 
the other hand, another employee can put forth very high effort but perform poorly because of bad luck. 
In that case, should the employee be punished for a bad outcome or rewarded for a high effort? Despite 
settled theoretical predictions, there is very little empirical research investigating how luck and effort play 
in remuneration in settings where effort is unobservable (Charness and Kuhn, 2011). This is 
understandable because it is difficult to measure empirically to what degree effort versus luck impacts 
individual performance. It is even more difficult to evaluate how employers reward effort versus luck, 
because remuneration is usually based on final performance which is a function of effort, ability and luck 
(Ericsson and Charness, 1994). 
The second problem firms can face when contracting with employees is contract enforceability 
and verifiability. Even where legal institutions exist, writing a first-best, fully contingent contract is often 
impossible when effort is not verifiable. This problem is especially stark when random shocks affect the 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Harris and Raviv (1979), Holmström (1979), Shavell (1979), Holmström and Milgrom (1991), 
Baker (1992). Prendergast (1999) provides a more general overview of the contracts literature that emerged in the 
1970s - 1990s. 
2
 See, for example, Grossman and Hart (1983), Milgrom and Roberts (1992), and Laffont and Martimort (2002). 
3
 According to the “informativeness principle” of Holmström (1979), when perfect information is not available, any 
observable measure of performance reveals information about the effort level chosen by the agent and should be 
used in the compensation contract. When effort is perfectly observable, the problem of optimal contract design is 
trivial: remuneration should be based on effort and not luck. This is sometimes referred to as the “accountability 
principle” (Konow, 2000, 2003), which states that remuneration should be based on the relevant variables that an 
individual can influence (i.e., effort) but not those that he cannot influence (i.e., luck). 
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mapping from effort to outcome. For example, if a contract offers a wage in return for the first-best effort, 
the agent has incentive to provide less than the first-best effort if there is a high enough probability that he 
will get lucky (due to a positive production shock). Since the principal cannot verify whether the outcome 
is due to effort or luck, the principal cannot enforce the contract. 
Fehr et al. (1997) provide experimental evidence that the contract enforceability problem is 
partially mitigated by behavioral concerns for reciprocity. They build on an extensive literature which 
suggests that the reciprocity motivation can help explain a host of results that are contrary to standard 
economic theory.
4
 One implication of this literature is that contracts based on reciprocity come closer to 
the first-best than standard contract theory dictates. Fehr et al. (1997) test this implication with a gift 
exchange experiment, where principals offer contracts that include wages and desired effort levels. 
Agents who accept the contracts receive the wage and choose an effort level (where higher effort 
improves the principal’s payoff), but they do not have to abide by the desired effort level in the contract. 
The money-maximizing Nash equilibrium is for the agent to provide zero effort (since it is costly and they 
cannot be punished) and for the principal to thus offer the lowest possible wage. In their experiment, 
however, agents frequently show positive reciprocity; not only do they provide more effort than the 
money-maximizing Nash equilibrium prediction, but their effort level is increasing in the wage offered by 
the principal. These results are exacerbated when principals are also allowed to exhibit reciprocity. In one 
treatment, Fehr et al. (1997) introduce a third stage in which principals can pay to punish or reward the 
agent after observing their effort. Although the addition of this stage does not alter the money-maximizing 
Nash equilibrium predictions of wage or effort, they find that allowing both sides to exhibit reciprocity 
significantly increases effort (and thus efficiency), and that both principals and agents are better off than 
they are when only agents are allowed to show reciprocity. Fehr et al. (2007) provide further evidence 
that this type of bonus contract vastly outperforms standard incentive-based contracts despite relying on 
unenforceable actions. 
These papers contribute significantly to our knowledge of how behavioral incentives encourage 
contract enforcement in the absence of explicit incentives. Yet, Fehr et al. (1997) and Fehr et al. (2007) 
only consider how reciprocity improves contract efficiency under perfect information. In their 
experiments, principals can reward or punish agents based on perfectly observed effort – there are no 
random shocks affecting the mapping from effort to outcome. This is an important omission, because the 
types of contracts they are concerned with are often difficult to enforce in the real world precisely 
                                                          
4
 There is a wealth of experimental evidence that both positive and negative reciprocity have important effects on 
actions, with negative reciprocity being shown as more salient. In the context of the gift-exchange experiment 
employed in this paper, see Charness and Haruvy (2002), Charness (2004), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Fehr 
and Schmidt (2007), and Houser at al. (2008). Rabin (1993) provides the canonical model introducing reciprocity 
into game theory, and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) provide a theory connecting the reciprocity motive to a host of 
standard experimental results. Fehr and Gächter (2000) provide a survey of the literature on reciprocity. 
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because outcomes are affected by shocks and thus optimal effort levels are impossible to induce in an 
exogenously enforced contract. Indeed, it is not clear ex-ante how the introduction of shocks interacts 
with the reciprocity motive. Do principals exhibit reciprocity when they are unsure that the outcome 
which they observe is the result of the agent’s effort? 
This paper addresses this problem. We conduct a gift exchange experiment similar to Fehr et al. 
(1997), except that the principal receives an imperfect signal of the agent’s effort in some treatments. Our 
first treatment is similar to Fehr et al.’s (1997) bonus treatment. Principals and agents are randomly 
matched and the principal offers a wage and asks for a desired effort. The agent then receives the wage 
and can choose any effort (where the cost of effort is increasing in effort chosen). The principal can then 
reward or punish the agent, although either is costly. There are no shocks in this treatment, so we employ 
it as our baseline. The second treatment is exactly the same as the first, except that we add a random 
(uniformly distributed) number to the agent’s effort. In this treatment, there is still perfect information; 
the principal observes both the effort level and the random number when making her decision of how 
much to punish or reward the agent. The final treatment is exactly like the second treatment, except that 
principals only observe the outcome (effort + random number), not the agent’s effort. Relationships in all 
treatments are one-shot and anonymous, so reputational concerns are absent. 
Consistent with previous literature on gift exchange (Fehr et al., 1997, 2007; Charness and Kuhn, 
2011), we find that bonus contracts without shocks encourage effort and wages well above standard 
predictions. However, we also find evidence that this result is partially mitigated when random shocks are 
present. The mere introduction of shocks reduces wages and effort, regardless of whether the shocks are 
observed by the principal. 
What can explain our findings? Why should the introduction of a shock reduce wages and effort 
if the shock is perfectly observable? To address this question, we outline a model of reciprocity (in the 
context of our experiment) where subjects reciprocate based on either the effort or outcome of the 
previous game play.
5
 If wages and effort are solely encouraged by effort-based reciprocity, there should 
be no difference between the baseline treatment (without shocks) and the treatment where shocks are 
perfectly observed, since the reciprocity motive is based on the other’s action, not the outcome emanating 
from the action. On the other hand, if wages and effort are solely encouraged by outcome-based 
reciprocity, there should be no difference between the treatment where shocks are perfectly observed and 
the treatment where shocks are not observed, since the mapping from effort to expected outcome (and 
reciprocity) is the same in both cases. Moreover, the effort exerted in these two treatments should be 
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 We consider only these cases where subjects reciprocate based solely on effort or outcome. In reality, it is likely 
that the reciprocity motive is some combination of the two. The implication is that the actual outcome should be 
somewhere in the middle of the two proposed outcomes. 
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lower than in the baseline treatment, since it is more costly to “make up” for a bad shock than it is to scale 
back effort for a “good shock” (the cost curve is increasing and convex). 
We find evidence in favor of subjects exhibiting outcome-based reciprocity. In the treatment 
where principals observe both the agent’s effort and the shock, principals do indeed vary their 
adjustments based on the shock, which is outside the control of the agent. This suggests that reciprocity is 
in part influenced by the outcome the principal receives, even if the principal knows that part of this 
outcome was influenced by luck. Moreover, as the outcome-based reciprocity hypothesis suggests, wages 
and effort are significantly lower in treatments where shocks are perfectly observed relative to the 
baseline, and we observe no differences in behavior between treatments where shocks are present and 
observable and treatments where shocks are present and unobservable. 
These results have a number of important implications. First, our results provide evidence that the 
reciprocity motive in the principal-agent settings is based on the outcome (i.e., which is a function of 
effort and shocks) of others’ actions and not simply on their intentions (i.e., effort). In this regard, we 
contribute to the literature studying how individual behavior is impacted by intentions and outcomes 
(Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). We show that this result has significant welfare implications: welfare-
enhancing effort is lower in the presence of shocks, even when the shocks are perfectly observable. 
Second, our results contribute to the large literature on gift exchange. Charness and Kuhn (2011) review 
the experimental evidence on gift exchange, concluding that gift exchange is a robust phenomenon in that 
higher wages lead to higher effort. Our study contributes to this literature by demonstrating that the 
existence of random shocks is an important boundary condition of gift exchange. To this end, our study 
adds to an important literature, highlighted by List (2007), examining how the introduction of realistic 
elements and institutions into gift exchange settings impacts individual behavior (e.g., Gneezy and List, 
2006; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Charness and Gneezy, 2008). Gneezy and List (2006), for example, show 
that positive reciprocity effects detected in laboratory gift exchange experiments can wear off quickly in 
the field. Similarly, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) show that reciprocity declines when principals try to control 
agents’ performance. On the other hand, Charness and Gneezy (2008) show that agents are more 
reciprocal when anonymity is reduced. Our results add yet one more realistic element, showing that the 
ability of reciprocity to overcome incentive problems inherent in principal-agent settings is greatly 
reduced when the agent’s effort is distorted by random shocks and transmitted imperfectly to the principal 
(as is usually the case in the real world). 
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2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
Our experimental design is built on a variation of a gift exchange game. The game consists of 
three stages. In stage 1, the principal offers contract (w,e) to the agent. That is, the principal offers a wage 
w (any integer number between 1 and 100) and the desired effort e (an integer number between 0 and 14) 
that she would like the agent to undertake.
6
 In stage 2, the agent receives the wage w and chooses an 
effort level e, which does not have to be equal to the desired effort e specified by the contract. The cost of 
effort c(e) is an increasing and convex function of effort, where c(e) = e
2
/2. In stage 3, the principal first 
observes the outcome y = e + ε, which is a function of effort e and a uniformly distributed random 
component ε (an integer number between -2 and +2). As we explain below, the primary difference 
between treatments is what the principal can observe ({y, e, ε} or just y). After observing y, the principal 
chooses an adjustment level a (an integer number between -5 and +5), which can be either in a form of a 
bonus (a > 0) or punishment (a < 0).
7
 The payoff of the principal is πP = 10y – w – |a| and the payoff of 
the agent is πA = w – c(e) + 10a.8 The range of payoffs in any one period can vary substantially for both 
players, ranging from -105 to 160 for the principal and -148 to 150 for the agent.
9
 
We employ three treatments, which we name based on what the principal observes. In the 
baseline Effort-Only treatment there is no random component (i.e., ε = 0), and the principal directly 
observes effort e (there is no difference between effort and outcome, since y = e). This treatment is 
similar to Fehr et al.’s (1997) “bonus” treatment and provides a baseline to which we compare our results. 
In the Effort-Shock treatment, there is a random shock component ε, which the principal observes. That 
is, the principal directly observes y, e, and ε. Finally, the Outcome-Only treatment is the same as the 
Effort-Shock treatment, but the principal only observes outcome y and does not know the composition of 
y.
10
 
                                                          
6
 We chose the range between 0 and 14 for effort and desired effort for two reasons. First, it ensures that the 
maximum cost of effort is less than the maximum possible wage (cost of effort of 14 is equal to 98). Second, we 
wanted the efficient effort (10) to be an internal point (between 0 and 14), so that agents were not anchored to the 
efficient effort artificially (which could happen if the effort range was between 0 and 10). 
7
 We chose the range between -5 and 5 for the adjustment because we wanted the ability to punish or reward to be 
large enough that most subjects would choose an internal point (to reduce censoring biases). We felt that this range 
accomplishes both of these goals while not being so large that contracts are completely based on bonuses or 
punishments. 
8
 In the treatments with shocks, the entire burden of the risk is placed on the principal, as the shock is realized after 
the agent chooses effort and the shock directly enters the principal’s payoff function. 
9
 The principal can receive a payoff of up to 140 in the treatment without shocks. In the experiment, principals’ 
single period payouts ranged from -95 to 150 and agents’ single period payouts ranged from -121 to 124. 
10
 The two treatments that we introduce are novel and have not been studied previously. However, some elements of 
our design are related to Xiao and Kunreuther (2015), who examine behavior in a two-person prisoner’s dilemma 
game with stochastic versus certain outcomes, and to Cappelen et al. (2013), who study fairness views about risk-
taking with ex ante versus ex post stochastic outcomes.   
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In all treatments, the money-maximizing subgame perfect equilibrium is for the agent to choose 
an effort of zero (i.e., e = 0) and for the principal to make an adjustment of zero (i.e., a = 0). The socially 
optimal actions are for the agent to choose an effort of 10 (i.e., e = 10) and for the principal to provide an 
adjustment level of +5 (i.e., a = 5), providing a total welfare gain of 95 (10*10 – 50 + 50 – 5).11  
We recruited subjects randomly from the student body of a mid-sized university in the United 
States. A total of 216 subjects were recruited from a standard campus-wide subject pool. Subjects 
interacted with each other anonymously over a local computer network. The experiment, which lasted an 
average of 45 minutes total, proceeded as follows. Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to 
computer terminals and received instructions (see Appendix) corresponding to one of the three treatments. 
The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We ran 9 sessions (3 sessions per 
treatment) with 24 subjects in each session. 
Within each session, subjects were split into 3 groups of 8.
12
 Within each group of 8, 4 subjects 
were assigned to be principals and 4 were assigned to be agents. Subjects stayed in their role assignment 
throughout the entire experiment. In each session there were 10 periods of play. In each period subjects 
from opposite role assignments were randomly matched to form a principal-agent pair. After each period 
subjects were randomly re-matched with someone of the opposite role assignment within their 8-person 
group to form a new principal-agent pair. Each period proceeded in three stages. In the first stage, the 
principal chose a reward (an integer number between 0 and 100) and a desired effort (an integer number 
between 0 and 14) for the agent. After observing the reward and the desired effort, in the second stage, the 
agent chose an effort level (an integer number between 0 and 14). To determine the outcome, in the 
Outcome-Only and Effort-Shock treatments, the computer added to the effort a randomly selected number 
(an integer between -2 and +2).
13
 Then, depending on the treatment, the computer displayed to the 
principal either only the outcome (Outcome-Only), the outcome, effort, and the random number (Effort-
Shock), or effort (Effort-Only). After observing the relevant information, in the third stage, the principal 
choose an adjustment level for the agent (an integer between -5 and +5). 
                                                          
11
 This does mean that nearly half of the welfare-maximizing contract comes from the bonus, while we are primarily 
concerned with the welfare implications of the effort chosen by the agent. Yet, since the bonus is costly and is 
chosen in the final stage of a one-shot game, there is no opportunity for the principal to receive any future 
reciprocity from the agent. Hence, we expect that most of the surplus gain will come from effort and not from the 
bonus. We indeed find this; Figure 2 indicates that in no treatment did more than 10% of principals give the highest 
possible adjustment of 5. 
12
 We divided the subjects into three groups per session in order to have three independent observations at the 
session level. This allows for the use of non-parametric tests, which we employ in Section 4. Subjects were not told 
that they were split into three groups of eight. 
13
 We allowed principals to receive a negative payout if effort plus the random number was negative. 
7 
 
At the end of each experiment, 1 out of 10 periods were randomly selected for payment.
14
 The 
earnings in this period were exchanged at rate of 10 francs = $1. All subjects also received a participation 
fee of $20 to cover potential losses. On average, subjects earned $26 each (maximum $42 and minimum 
$7), which was paid anonymously and in cash.
15
 
 
3. Predictions 
Before proceeding to the results of the experiment, we provide intuition and predictions for how 
subjects might act under different experimental settings. To this end, we verbally discuss a model 
focusing on the reciprocity motive.
16
 After all, the experiment is centered on a double gift exchange – 
with agents gifting principals with effort and principals gifting agents with adjustments – and reciprocity 
is a key motivation of gift exchange.  
It is not obvious what might motivate people to reciprocate in the context of our experiment. The 
literature provides some insights, as numerous studies have shown that subjects often reciprocate based 
on both effort and outcome. For instance, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) provide a theory of reciprocity 
centered on the idea that people base reciprocity on both the intentions and consequences of an action. 
There are also recent studies on risk taking, redistribution, and charitable giving that show that some 
subjects condition their giving and reciprocity on both effort and luck of others (Charness and Levine, 
2007; Erkal et al., 2011; Cappelen et al., 2013; Gurdal et al., 2013; Rey-Biel et al., 2015). Hence, in this 
section, we present intuition for how the reciprocity motive might affects individual actions in the context 
of our experiment under two conditions: (1) principals reward agents based solely on effort, and (2) 
principals reward agents based on the outcome of the agent’s actions (effort plus shock).17 In reality, it is 
                                                          
14
 When subjects are paid for multiple periods in a single experiment, the payment from one period may impact 
subjects’ choices in another. According to Azrieli et al. (2013), paying for one randomly selected period is the only 
mechanism (under a wide array of assumptions) that mitigates this inter-period problem that could otherwise cause 
some loss of control for the experimenter. 
15
 The fact that subjects receive a high participation fee of $20 does not diminish the saliency of subject payments, 
because subjects may win or lose a substantial amount of money. In fact, in our experiment, some subjects made as 
much as $42, while others made as little as $7. 
16
 We drafted a formal model, and we found that the equilibrium outcomes are dependent on how reciprocity is 
modeled. The two extreme forms of reciprocity studied in this section – where reciprocity is either based solely on 
effort or on outcome – provide the same results in the formal model as they are described in this section. Since we 
did not design the experiment to extract the shape of the reciprocity function – meaning that we cannot derive any 
meaningful testable predictions with respect to its shape – and the “extreme” results are straight-forward to discuss 
verbally anyhow, we have only included a verbal discussion of the model in order to facilitate the reader’s intuition 
for the results that we find in our analysis. 
17
 Focusing on the case where principals reward agents based on the fairness of the agent’s actions (Rabin 1993; 
Fehr and Gächter, 2000) gives qualitatively similar predictions. This is true, specifically, under the following 
fairness principle: if the agent anticipates a positive shock (with some probability), it is “fair” for the agent to split 
some of the surplus with the principal in the form of lower effort (as long as the outcome is also not lower), while if 
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likely that subjects will reciprocate based on some combination of effort and outcome, as the above cited 
papers suggest. Yet, focusing on the two extreme cases allow us to shed some light on which mechanism 
is more important in determining outcomes. 
In the third stage, principals are able to show reciprocity for high (low) effort or outcome with a 
positive (negative) and costly adjustment. We assume that the principals’ reciprocity motive is a relative 
one; that is, it is a function of the agent’s effort (or outcome) relative to the desired effort. If principals 
reward agents based solely on their effort and not the outcome, this means that the adjustment does not 
vary with the size of the shock, since the shock is outside the agent’s control. On the other hand, if 
principals reward agents based on the outcome of their actions, then principals account for the fact that 
there is a component of the outcome that is beyond the agent’s control, and the adjustment will vary with 
the shock. We also assume that agents show reciprocity as an increasing function of the wage that 
principals give them in the first stage. Specifically, we provide predictions for two scenarios: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Principals reciprocate based on effort, meaning that principals set their adjustments based 
on the effort given by agents relative to desired effort, not the outcome. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Principals reciprocate based on outcome, meaning that principals set their adjustments 
based on the outcome (effort plus shock) relative to desired effort. 
 
In our experiment, three treatments are considered: Effort-Only (where there is no shock), Effort-
Shock (where the principal sees the effort and the shock before choosing an adjustment), and Outcome-
Only (where the principal sees the outcome, but not the effort or shock value, before choosing an 
adjustment). As we show below, the two hypotheses provide different testable predictions for the Effort-
Only and Effort-Shock treatments. Hence, comparing these two treatments allows us to falsify at least one 
of the hypotheses. We therefore begin by discussing testable predictions for only the Effort-Only and 
Effort-Shock treatments. 
 Consider Hypothesis 1, where principals reciprocate based solely on effort (relative to desired 
effort), and agents know that principals reciprocate in this manner. In this case, the adjustment given by 
the principal should not vary as the shock varies. Hence, the existence of a shock should not affect the 
agent’s effort in equilibrium (conditional on wage and desired effort) in the Effort-Shock treatment 
relative to the Effort-Only treatment, since principals can perfectly observe the agent’s effort and the 
shock. There should also be no difference in the principal’s wage and desired effort in these two 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the agent anticipates a negative shock (with some probability), it is “fair” for the agent to make up for some of the 
lost surplus with extra effort (since the principal is the residual claimant of the lost surplus). 
9 
 
treatments, as agents should be expected to react the same to these two choices in both treatments. This 
logic is summarized in Prediction 1.
 
 
 
Prediction 1: If principals reciprocate based solely on effort (Hypothesis 1), then adjustments should 
not vary across shock levels (conditional on effort) in the Effort-Shock treatment, and 
there should be no difference in any of the subject’s choices (wage, desired effort, effort, 
adjustment) in the Effort-Only and Effort-Shock treatments. 
 
Next, consider Hypothesis 2, where principals reciprocate based on the outcome. In this case, the 
principal’s adjustment is increasing in the shock in the Effort-Shock treatment – as the shock increases, 
the outcome increases, which motivates greater reciprocation. When agents choose their effort level, they 
know that there is a 0.2 probability that they will receive each of the shocks from the set {-2, -1, 0, 1, 2}. 
Since effort plays a smaller role in determining the adjustment in the Effort-Shock treatment than in the 
Effort-Only treatment – the shock plays a role in determining the adjustment in the former but not the 
latter – the net marginal return of higher effort is lower in the Effort-Shock treatment.18 Since effort is 
costly and increasing in a convex manner, the incentive to “make up” for lost effort in the negative shock 
case is less than the incentive to reduce effort created by a positive shock (due to the convex nature of the 
cost of effort curve), and the weighted effort is therefore lower in the Effort-Shock treatment than in the 
Effort-Only treatment. As a result, principals give a lower wage and ask for less desired effort in the 
Effort-Shock treatment, since their “gift” (i.e., wage), is less effective at inducing effort. This logic is 
summarized in Prediction 2. 
 
Prediction 2: If principals reciprocate based on the outcome (Hypothesis 2), then adjustments should be 
increasing in the shock in the Effort-Shock treatment, and the average effort, wage, and 
desired effort are lower in the Effort-Shock treatment than in the Effort-Only treatment. 
 
These two predictions allow us to falsify either Hypothesis 1 or 2 (or both). Of course, we are 
also interested in how subjects behave in the Outcome-Only treatment; indeed, this is the treatment that is 
                                                          
18
 To see this, assume that agents place equal weight on all five of the possible shocks and act according to the 
weighted sum of their different actions. One-fifth of the time there is a zero shock, and the adjustment given by 
principals (conditional on effort, desired effort, and wage) should be the same as in the Effort-Only treatment, since 
effort equals outcome. With 0.4 probability there is a positive shock. In this case, the agents want to give less effort 
than when there is a zero shock, but only to the extent that the outcome is not too small. Finally, with 0.4 probability 
there is a negative shock. Here, agents may want to give more than in the zero shock case in order to “make up” for 
the negative shock. However, the incentive to do so is partially mitigated by the fact that this involves a greater cost 
of effort, which is increasing at an increasing rate. 
10 
 
most similar to real world principal-agent settings. In this treatment, principals do not observe effort, only 
the outcome. This gives agents the opportunity to “hide behind randomness” in stage 2 (Andreoni and 
Bernheim, 2009; Aimone and Hauser, 2011), acting selfishly when they can ascribe their actions to 
chance. 
We focus here on predictions for the Outcome-Only treatment under Hypothesis 2.
19
 In stage 3, 
principals can only see the outcome, not the effort or shock. Therefore, the principal should show greater 
reciprocity as the outcome increases (relative to desired effort) and the adjustment should be the same as 
in the Effort-Shock treatment. Given this logic, the agent’s choice of effort in stage 2 is exactly the same 
in the Outcome-Only and Effort-Shock treatments. In both treatments, the agent does not know the shock 
value when choosing effort, and the only thing that matters to the principal when choosing the adjustment 
is the outcome. Hence, the decision-making calculus is the same for the agent in both treatments. From 
Prediction 2, this entails that the average effort as well as the average wage and desired effort are lower in 
the Outcome-Only treatment than in the Effort-Only treatment. This logic is summarized in Prediction 3. 
 
Prediction 3: If principals reciprocate based on the outcome (Hypothesis 2), then adjustments, average 
effort, wage, and desired effort should be the same in the Outcome-Only and Effort-
Shock treatments, while the average effort, wage, and desired effort are lower in the 
Outcome-Only treatment than in the Effort-Only treatment. 
 
4. Results 
We observed 2160 contracts in our experiment.
20
 Table 1 provides the summary statistics across 
all three treatments. When performing statistical tests, we mainly use non-parametric tests to examine 
treatment effects. Each treatment has a total of 9 independent observations (72 subjects per treatment, 
split into 9 separate groups of 8 subjects each). When appropriate, we also estimate panel models with 
individual subjects representing random effects (to control for individual effects), standard errors 
                                                          
19
 We find evidence contrary to Prediction 1 in the following section, suggesting that principals do not reciprocate 
based solely on effort. Hence, we do not discuss predictions of the Outcome-Only treatment under Hypothesis 1. 
Solving for how subjects act under this hypothesis is not trivial and the direction of the comparative statics (vis-à-vis 
other treatments) depend on the level of the choices in the other treatments. 
20
 Out of 2160 contracts, 1338 (62%) can be classified as individually rational and incentive compatible (IR/IC). 
These are contracts in which both the principal’s and the agent’s payoffs are non-negative, conditional on the 
contract being fulfilled. Specifically, IR/IC contracts (w,e) satisfy the following two conditions: 10e – w ≥ 0 and w – 
c(e) ≥ 0. We chose not to put any restrictions on the principal’s decisions, because some ex-ante “non-IR/IC” 
contracts (w,e) may be IR/IC ex-post, given a certain level of an adjustment a. For an experiment where the 
principal can only offer contracts which satisfy IR/IC see Bartling et al. (2012). All major results hold when we 
focus only on the IR/IC contracts. We analyze in detail the IR/IC contracts in Appendix B and the non-IR/IC 
contracts in Appendix C. 
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clustered at the single re-matching group level of 8 subjects (to control for possible correlation within a 
matching group), and an inverse period trend (to control for learning and experience). We consider the 
results starting with stage 3 first and work our way backwards to stage 1. 
 
4.1. Adjustment 
In stage 3, principals choose an adjustment after seeing either the effort of the agent (in Effort-
Only and Effort-Shock) or the outcome (in Outcome-Only and Effort-Shock) in stage 2. Figure 1 displays 
the average adjustment over periods by treatment, while Figure 2 displays the distribution of adjustment 
by treatment. Both the distribution and the average adjustment levels are very similar in all three 
treatments. Based on the Wilcoxon rank-sum test there is no significant difference in the adjustment level 
between treatments: Effort-Only versus Outcome-Only (0.14 versus -0.50; p-value = 0.33, n1 = 9, n2 = 9), 
Effort-Only versus Effort-Shock (0.14 versus -0.18; p-value = 0.82, n1 = 9, n2 = 9), and Outcome-Only 
versus Effort-Shock (-0.50 versus -0.18; p-value = 0.60, n1 = 9, n2 = 9).
21
 
This suggests the possibility that the adjustment mechanism works relatively similar in all three 
treatments. However, these results may arise from the fact that we consider the unconditional adjustment 
in stage 3. The model suggests that the conditional adjustment (that is, conditional on wage, effort, 
desired effort, and possibly the shock) may differ across treatments, and it can also give some insight into 
the motivations of the subjects. Specifically, if principals reciprocate based on effort, the adjustment 
should not vary with the shock in the Effort-Shock treatment (Prediction 1), whereas the adjustment 
should vary with the shock if principals reciprocate based on outcome (Prediction 2). More generally, if 
the reciprocity motive is present in the principal’s decision, we expect the adjustment to be a function of 
how “kindly” she was treated by the agent in stage 2. In other words, we expect the principal’s adjustment 
to be a function of the difference between the effort (or outcome) she observes in stage 2 minus the 
desired effort proposed in stage 1. It is also possible that the principal expects the agent to show 
reciprocity in stage 2 if the principal gives a large wage in stage 1, so the adjustment may also be 
conditional on wage. 
We first test whether the effort (minus desired effort) varies across shock level in the Effort-
Shock treatment. Table 2 reports the average adjustment in the Effort-Only and Effort-Shock treatments, 
as a function of whether effort – desired effort is negative, zero, or positive and for the Effort-Shock 
                                                          
21
 We have also checked the robustness of these results using panel regression analysis. Specifically, we have 
estimated different panel models where individual subjects represent the random effects, and the standard errors are 
clustered at the single re-matching group level. The dependent variable in all specifications is the adjustment and the 
independent variables are an inverse of period, wage, effort – desired effort (in Effort-Only and Effort-Shock) and 
outcome – desired effort (in Outcome-Only), as well as treatment dummies. All regressions indicate no significant 
difference in adjustment level between the three treatments. The estimation results are available in Appendix D. 
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treatment whether the shock is negative, zero, or positive. The results provide a preliminary basis for 
rejecting the effort-based reciprocity hypothesis, as adjustments appear to vary as the shock varies. 
Focusing on the case where effort – desired effort is negative (since N is high enough in this case to 
support statistics), the average adjustment made after a negative shock is -1.11, whereas the average 
adjustment made after a positive shock is -0.32. This difference is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney, 
p-value = 0.02). In fact, even the average adjustment made after a zero shock, -0.55 is marginally greater 
than the average adjustment made after a negative shock (p-value = 0.10).
22
 Since the average adjustment 
varies as the shock varies, we can reject the hypothesis that principals reciprocate based solely on effort. 
Next, we test whether principals condition their adjustments based on previous actions. Table 3 
reports the estimation results of different panel models where individual subjects represent the random 
effects, and the standard errors are calculated using a bootstrap method.
23
 The dependent variable in all 
specifications is the adjustment and the independent variables in specifications (1)-(3) are an inverse of a 
period trend, wage, effort – desired effort (in Effort-Only and Effort-Shock), and outcome – desired effort 
(in Outcome-Only).
24
 In specifications (1) and (2), adjustment is positively correlated with effort – 
desired effort. In specification (3), adjustment is positively correlated with outcome – desired effort. This 
finding supports the idea that principals show reciprocity, since they reward higher effort (outcome) 
relative to desired effort.
25
 
While these results suggest that principals reward a “kind” effort with kindness of their own, the 
magnitude of this reward is different across treatments. In the Effort-Only treatment, principals increase 
their average adjustment by 0.38 for every unit of effort given (relative to desired effort), whereas the 
marginal increase is only 0.23 in response to an increase in effort in the Effort-Shock treatment. In these 
two treatments, principals see the same information. The difference in the magnitude of these coefficients 
reaffirms the conjecture that principals do not reciprocate based solely on the intention (i.e., effort) of the 
agent. Indeed, in specification (4), we also include the shock as an independent variable. Consistent with 
our previous findings in Table 2, we find that the adjustment and the shock variables are positively 
correlated, suggesting that principals punish or reward agents based in part on outcomes. In fact, a 
                                                          
22
 The differences in average adjustment across different shock levels are not significant when effort – desired effort 
is 0 or positive (although in two cases the p-value comes very close to significance), but this is likely due to the low 
number of observations in these cases. 
23
 Since we have a relatively low number of clusters, we have used bootstrap method to calculate the standard errors 
within each cluster (Cameron et al., 2008). 
24
 Principals do not see effort in the Outcome-Only treatment, so we condition on outcome minus desired effort. 
25
 Table 2 suggests that principals pay a significant, and possibly discontinuous, premium for having contracts 
fulfilled (i.e., effort ≥ desired effort). We test this by re-analyzing the results in Table 3, replacing the 
“effort/outcome – desired effort” variables with dummies for whether the contract was fulfilled. The coefficients on 
these dummies are highly significant in all 5 specifications and their magnitudes range from 1.61 to 2.06. The 
coefficient on the shock variable in column (4) remains highly significant, and none of the results reported above are 
qualitatively altered. 
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comparison of specifications (3) and (5) suggests that principals respond similarly (0.21 versus 0.23) to an 
increase in outcome regardless of whether or not the effort is observed.
26
 
 
Result 1: There is no significant difference in the unconditional adjustment level between 
treatments. The adjustment level varies positively with effort and the shock. 
 
4.2. Effort 
We next consider the effort that the agent chooses in stage 2. Figure 3 displays the average effort 
over periods by treatment, while Figure 4 displays the distribution of effort by treatment. Based on the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we find that the average effort in the Effort-Only treatment is higher than in the 
Outcome-Only treatment (6.40 versus 4.69; p-value = 0.02, n1 = 9, n2 = 9) and the Effort-Shock treatment 
(6.40 versus 4.69; p-value = 0.01, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). On the other hand, the average effort is not different 
between the Outcome-Only and Effort-Shock treatments (4.69 versus 4.69; p-value = 0.82, n1 = 9, n2 = 
9).
27
 These results are consistent with Predictions 2 and 3 of the model, which suggest that the effort 
given in the Effort-Only treatments is higher than in the other two treatments if principals reciprocate 
based on the outcome of the game play. 
The intuition laid out previously indicates two reasons why agents may choose effort greater than 
the money-maximizing Nash prediction of zero. First, they may believe that a higher effort will lead to a 
greater reward (or smaller punishment) in stage 3. We showed in the previous section that such beliefs are 
accurate, although there are treatment differences. Second, they may exhibit positive reciprocity if the 
principal gives them a high wage in the first stage. That is, their effort is in part conditional on actions 
taken in stage 1. We test this possibility by conducting a panel analysis within each treatment. Table 4 
reports the estimation results of different panel models, where the dependent variable in all specifications 
                                                          
26
 It is possible that the relationship between “reciprocity” (adjustment) and “kindness” (effort gap or outcome gap) 
is not linear (Baumeister et al., 2001; Offerman, 2002; Andreoni et al., 2003; Charness, 2004; Bellemare et al., 
2007). Bellemare et al. (2007), for example, suggest that reciprocity is a concave function of kindness (i.e. 
increasing in the degree of kindness increases reciprocity, but at a diminishing rate). Moreover, following the papers 
by Abbink et al. (2000), Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Baumeister et al. (2001), many studies have shown that 
“negative” reciprocity is stronger than “positive” reciprocity (see Charness and Kuhn, 2011). In results that are 
available upon request, we control for both non-linearities and distinctions between positive and negative kindness. 
Our results indicate that both positive and negative reciprocity increase in the degree of “kindness” (i.e., effort – 
desired effort and outcome – desired effort are positively correlated with adjustment). Moreover, positive reciprocity 
increases at a diminishing rate (i.e., (effort – desired effort)2 and (outcome – desired effort)2 are negative) and 
negative reciprocity decreases at a diminishing rate (i.e., (effort – desired effort)2 and (outcome – desired effort)2 are 
positive). These results are not always statistically significant, however. 
27
 We have also checked the robustness of these results using a panel regression analysis controlling for individual 
subject effects, re-matching groups, learning, wage, and desired effort. The regression results corroborate our main 
findings: effort is greater in Effort-Only than in the other two treatments, but there is no difference between Effort-
Shock and Outcome-Only treatments. The estimation results are available in Appendix D. 
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is the subject’s effort and the independent variables are an inverse of a period trend, wage and desired 
effort. In all specifications, there is a positive and significant relationship between wage and effort, 
suggesting a gift exchange story between the principal and the agent. 
 
Result 2: There is a greater effort in the Effort-Only treatment than in the other two treatments, 
while there is no significant difference in effort between the Effort-Shock and Outcome-
Only treatments. The effort level responds positively to wage in all three treatments. 
 
 It is reasonable to suspect that the principal’s willingness to reciprocate is not just a function of 
the absolute level of effort (or outcome), but it is also a function of the difference between effort/outcome 
and desired effort. Indeed, the results in Table 4 indicate that the magnitude of the effect of desired effort 
on the effort chosen differs between treatments. In the Effort-Only treatment, principals receive 11% of 
each additional unit of effort they desire (and this is statistically significant), whereas the magnitude is 8% 
in the Effort-Shock treatment and 5% in the Outcome-Only treatment (although neither are statistically 
significant). These results suggest that agents form reasonably correct beliefs regarding how principals 
will act in the adjustment period. Table 3 suggests that the adjustment response to effort – desired effort is 
strongest in the Effort-Only treatment, indicating that agents with correct beliefs should increase their 
effort the most in this treatment in response to an increase in desired effort. 
Yet, even if agents correctly predict how principals act in stage 3, it is not clear ex ante how the 
introduction of shocks affects effort relative to desired effort. First, if agents believe that the most 
important thing to principals is whether the contract was fulfilled (i.e., effort/outcome ≥ desired effort) 
rather than by how much it was fulfilled by, we should expect to see the vast majority of effort within the 
interval [-2, 2] of desired effort. Any effort lower than this range allows the principal to know with 100% 
probability that the agent did not fulfill the contract, while any effort higher than this range involves more 
costly effort without affecting the principal’s perceived probability that the contract was fulfilled. This is 
precisely what we find in Figure 5, which shows the distribution of effort – desired effort in all three 
treatments. This figure indicates that the vast majority of observations in all three treatments fall within 
the interval [-2, +2], suggesting that agents do not perceive the desired effort simply as a cheap talk but 
rather as a concrete indication of the principal’s expectations. 
It is also quite clear from Figure 5 that the distribution of effort – desired effort is different in the 
three treatments. What can explain this? If agents are very risk averse, they may choose to give more 
effort than desired effort in the Outcome-Only treatment (relative to the Effort-Only treatment) in order to 
avoid any chance of being perceived as underperforming the desired effort. Whether agents choose effort 
greater than desired effort more frequently in the Effort-Shock treatment relative to the Effort-Only 
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treatment depends on the degree to which agents believe that principals reward/punish based on outcome 
relative to effort. If agents believe that principals reciprocate based solely on effort relative to desired 
effort (with a discontinuity at equality), they should not give effort above desired effort more frequently 
in the Effort-Shock treatment than in the Effort-Only treatment. They should give such extra effort in the 
Effort-Shock treatment, however, if outcomes are the primary driver of reciprocity, since negative shocks 
are possible. We do indeed find that the probability of effort exceeding the desired effort (based on the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test) is significantly lower in the Effort-Only treatment than in the Outcome-Only 
treatment (0.06 versus 0.17; p-value = 0.01, n1 = 9, n2 = 9), it is marginally lower in the Effort-Only than 
in the Effort-Shock treatment (0.06 versus 0.13; p-value = 0.10, n1 = 9, n2 = 9), and not significantly 
different between the Outcome-Only and Effort-Shock treatments (0.17 versus 0.13; p-value = 0.53, n1 = 
9, n2 = 9). This further corroborates the finding that agents expect principals to exhibit outcome-based 
reciprocity. 
Moreover, if agents at all suspect that principals base their adjustments on outcome rather than 
effort, we should expect to see contracts be exactly fulfilled (i.e., effort is equal to desired effort) more 
often in the Effort-Only treatment than in the other two treatments. There are no shocks in this treatment, 
so effort is equal to outcome, whereas shocks distort the mapping from effort to outcome in the other two 
treatments. Our results confirm this intuition. Agents choose efforts exactly specified by the contract in 
the Effort-Only treatment significantly more often than in the Outcome-Only treatment (0.29 versus 0.10; 
p-value < 0.01, n1 = 9, n2 = 9) and the Effort-Shock treatment (0.29 versus 0.17; p-value = 0.03, n1 = 9, n2 
= 9). There is no statistically significant difference between the Outcome-Only and Effort-Shock 
treatments (0.10 versus 0.17; p-value = 0.15, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). 
 
Result 3: Effort levels respond positively to desired effort in the Effort-Only and Effort-Shock 
treatments. There is a greater probability that effort exceeds desired effort in the 
Outcome-Only and Effort-Shock treatments than in the Effort-Only treatment, while 
there is a greater probability that the contract is exactly fulfilled in the Effort-Only 
treatment than in the other two treatments. 
 
4.3. Wage and Desired Effort 
In terms of welfare, the most important result presented thus far is Result 2, which indicates that 
effort is greater in the Effort-Only treatment than in the other two treatments. Where does this extra effort 
come from? Result 3 indicates that it does not come from agents giving extra effort relative to desired 
effort, although it may come from agents giving less effort than desired less frequently. This leaves two, 
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non-mutually exclusive, possibilities: (i) principals give higher wages and/or, (ii) ask for higher desired 
efforts in stage 1. 
Figures 6 and 8 display the average wage and desired effort over periods and by treatment, while 
Figures 7 and 9 display the distribution of wage and desired effort by treatment. The average wage and 
desired effort are the highest in the Effort-Only treatment. Using the average within a single re-matching 
group over all periods as one independent observation, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the average 
wage in the Effort-Only treatment is significantly higher than in the Effort-Shock treatment (41.14 versus 
33.45; p-value = 0.05, n1 = 9, n2 = 9) and Outcome-Only treatment (41.14 versus 33.85; p-value = 0.08, n1 
= 9, n2 = 9). Similarly, we find that the average desired effort is higher in the Effort-Only treatment than 
in the Effort-Shock treatment (8.95 versus 7.63; p-value = 0.02, n1 = 9, n2 = 9) and the Outcome-Only 
treatment (8.95 versus 7.63; p-value = 0.01, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). On the other hand, wage and desired effort are 
not different between the Outcome-Only and Effort-Shock treatments (p-values = 0.57 and 0.89, 
respectively).
28
 
 
Result 4: There is a greater wage and desired effort in the Effort-Only treatment than in the other 
two treatments, while there is no statistically significant difference in wage and desired 
effort between the Effort-Shock and Outcome-Only treatments. 
 
Result 4 indicates that the higher effort level observed in the Effort-Only treatment in Result 2 
results in part from both higher wages and higher desired effort levels in the Effort-Only treatment. Why 
do principals offer a higher wage and ask for greater desired effort in the Effort-Only treatment? Part of 
the answer follows from Table 4, which indicated that effort responds significantly to desired effort in the 
Effort-Only treatment and not in the other two treatments. Hence, principals have more to gain from 
asking for higher desired effort in the Effort-Only treatment than in the other two treatments. If higher 
wages are necessary to induce such effort, this would also explain why wage is greater in the Effort-Only 
treatment. In fact, we find that there is a strong correlation between wage and desired effort, ρ = 0.54, 
indicating that higher wages are associated with higher desired effort. 
 
                                                          
28
 We have also checked the robustness of these results using panel regression analysis, controlling for individual 
subject effects, re-matching groups, and learning. The regression results corroborate our main findings: wage and 
desired effort are greater in Effort-Only than in the other two treatments, but there is no difference between Effort-
Shock and Outcome-Only treatments. The estimation results are available in Appendix D. 
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4.4. Payoffs and Welfare 
As a consequence of higher wage and higher effort, the Effort-Only treatment generates a 
significantly higher payoff to the principal than the Outcome-Only treatment (20.91 versus 11.23; p-value 
= 0.05, n1 = 9, n2 = 9) and the Effort-Shock treatment (20.91 versus 12.04; p-value = 0.05, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). 
Yet, the principal’s payoff is not significantly different between the Outcome-Only and Effort-Shock 
treatments (11.23 versus 12.04; p-value = 0.89, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). When comparing payoffs of agents, we 
find no significant differences between the three treatments (all p-values > 0.48). 
 
Result 5: Principals’ payoffs in the Effort-Only treatment are higher than in the other two 
treatments, while there is no significant difference between the Effort-Shock and 
Outcome-Only treatments. There is no statistically significant difference in the agents’ 
payoffs between any of the treatments. 
 
The fact that principals are better off in the Effort-Only treatment but agents are not suggests that 
although principals offer higher wages in the Effort-Only treatment, this translates into higher effort 
levels which leave the agents equally well off but make principals better off. The principals are made 
better off by enough in the Effort-Only treatment that the overall welfare (principal’s payoff + agent’s 
payoff) is greater in the Effort-Only treatment than in the other two treatments: Effort-Only versus 
Outcome-Only (36.62 versus 29.67; p-value = 0.05, n1 = 9, n2 = 9) and Effort-Only versus Effort-Shock 
(36.62 versus 27.64; p-value = 0.01, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). On the other hand, there is no significant difference in 
the total welfare between the Effort-Shock and Outcome-Only treatments (27.64 versus 29.67; p-value = 
0.31, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). 
 
Result 6: Total welfare is greater in the Effort-Only treatment than in the other two treatments, 
while there is no statistically significant difference between the Effort-Shock and 
Outcome-Only treatments. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
We conduct a gift exchange experiment in which the agent’s outcome depends on both effort and 
luck. Consistent with the previous literature on gift exchange (Fehr et al., 1997, 2007; Charness and 
Kuhn, 2011), we find that bonus contracts without a shock component encourage effort and wages well 
above the money-maximizing Nash equilibrium prediction. We also find that a significant number of 
agents do not shirk and exert at least as much effort as is specified by the contract. 
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Two fundamental findings follow from our results. The first finding is that people reward in part 
on the basis of the outcome of the exchange, even if part of the outcome is determined by forces outside 
the control of the other party. This is not a new result. For instance, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) provide 
a theory of reciprocity centered on the idea that people base reciprocity on both the intentions and 
consequences of an action. Likewise, our result is consistent with a large literature on retrospective voting 
that finds voters reward/punish politicians based on outcomes over which politicians have no control 
(Healy et al., 2010; Gasper and Reeves, 2011). It is also consistent with a large literature in psychology on 
outcome bias (Baron and Hershey, 1988; Marshall and Mowen, 1993; Mazzocco et al., 2004).  
The novel and important result of our study is that the introduction of a shock in the principal-
agent settings significantly reduces wages and effort, regardless of whether the shock can be observed by 
the principal.
29
 The introduction of shocks in the principal-agent settings also significantly reduces the 
probability of fulfilling the contract by the agent, the payoff of the principal, as well as the total welfare. 
The fact that shocks, even perfectly observable, have such a significant and perhaps unexpected effect in 
principal-agent settings has important implications for the design of optimal contracts. 
What is it about the addition of shocks – observed or unobserved – that encourages principals to 
offer contracts with lower wages and desired effort levels? Why does the addition of shocks make agents 
less responsive to desired effort? While we cannot pinpoint the exact behavioral mechanism underlying 
our results, we can say something about theories which are inconsistent with our results. In particular, a 
satisfactory theory must account for the fact that the observability of the shock does not affect effort or 
welfare. This suggests that our results are not being driven by agents “hiding behind randomness”, where 
they give less effort when they can blame a bad outcome on a negative shock (even if the shock ended up 
not being negative). For instance, Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) argue that people like to be perceived as 
fair, and thus act selfishly when they can ascribe their actions to chance.
30
 But this motivation cannot 
account for the multitude of differences we see between the Effort-Only and Effort-Shock treatments; 
since agents cannot “hide behind randomness” in the latter treatment, they should not act differently than 
when there is no randomness. Indeed, any explanation that cannot account for differences based on the 
observability of actions cannot explain our treatment differences. 
                                                          
29
 Our findings contrast with the findings of Sloof and Van Praag (2010), who document that subjects exert higher 
efforts when there is more noise in the production process. However, our results are not directly comparable since 
we examine behavior of subjects in a chosen-effort principal-agent setting, while Sloof and Van Praag (2010) 
examine behavior in a real-effort experiment without a principal.  
30
 Aimone and Hauser (2011) also show that the “betrayal aversion” impulse is weaker when agents can hide behind 
randomness. In their experiment, betrayal aversion induces greater trust and hence greater efficiency. As noted 
above, however, this cannot explain why we do not find differences between our Effort-Only and Effort-Shock 
treatments. 
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What, then, can explain our results? First, our results are consistent with principals exhibiting 
outcome-based reciprocity. However, this simply means that we cannot reject this motivation as driving 
actions; it is possible that other motivations are at work as well. To this end, we believe that there are two 
other, non-mutually exclusive conjectures that are consistent with our results. The first conjecture has to 
do with the nature of gift exchange. Specifically, as wage and desired effort levels increase, the downside 
risk becomes greater due to the gift exchange nature of the game – the agent may not choose the desired 
effort level, and thus the higher wage is wasted. Likewise, when agents choose higher efforts, the 
downside risk that the principal will not reciprocate in the third stage is greater, since the effort chosen is 
more costly both in absolute and marginal terms. As the costs increase, players must be compensated by 
either higher payouts or lower uncertainty. The Effort-Only treatment offers the lowest uncertainty of the 
three, since agents know that principals receive an amount corresponding exactly to the amount of effort 
that they give. In this treatment, agents do not have to be concerned about whether the principal rewards 
based on intention or outcome. This, in turn, allows higher levels of effort to be sustained, as the 
additional risk inherent in the other two treatments makes high levels of effort too costly to be worth the 
risk. 
Second, it may be the case that the factors affecting expected reciprocity (e.g., fairness) interact 
with shocks in complex ways. That is, agents may be afraid that they will be treated unfairly if they 
receive a bad shock in the Outcome-Only or Effort-Shock treatments. If they believe that they will be 
unjustly punished if they choose effort equal to the desired effort but receive a negative random number, 
they may instead choose effort levels lower than desired effort, since high effort is costly. In fact, this 
may even be an optimal strategy in the presence of shocks. When an agent chooses effort within two 
levels of desired effort, the marginal gain of an additional unit of effort is only a 20% increase in the 
principle’s perceived probability that at least the desired effort level was given. Thus, agents have 
incentive at high effort levels to scale back their effort; this saves on rather large costs while minimally 
decreasing the probability of being perceived as choosing at least the desired effort. This effect is 
exacerbated if agents are averse to what they view as “unjust” punishment, since the marginal benefit to 
choosing at least the desired effort is lower when shocks are present. 
Neither of these possibilities is mutually exclusive. In fact, they both call for further research on 
just how and why shocks affect contract choice. While we know that formulating a complete, first-best 
contract is often not possible when shocks are present, our results suggest that the reciprocity motive does 
not completely mitigate this problem. Reciprocity does allow for more efficient results than standard 
contract theory would have us believe, but its effect is partially mitigated by the presence of shocks, 
whether or not the shocks are observed. 
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Figure 1: Average Adjustment by Period. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Adjustment. 
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Figure 3: Average Effort by Period. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Effort. 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Effort – Desired Effort. 
 
  
0
.1
.2
.3
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
-14 -10 -6 -2 2 6 10 14
Effort - Desired Effort
Effort-Only
0
.1
.2
.3
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
-14 -10 -6 -2 2 6 10 14
Effort - Desired Effort
Effort-Shock
0
.1
.2
.3
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
-14 -10 -6 -2 2 6 10 14
Effort - Desired Effort
Outcome-Only
27 
 
Figure 6: Average Wage by Period. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of Wage. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
W
a
g
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Period
Effort-Only Effort-Shock
Outcome-Only
0
.1
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Wage
Effort-Only
0
.1
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Wage
Effort-Shock
0
.1
.2
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Wage
Outcome-Only
28 
 
Figure 8: Average Desired Effort by Period. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Distribution of Desired Effort. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics. 
Treatment Wage 
Desired 
Effort Effort Outcome Adjustment 
Principal's 
Payoff 
Agent's 
Payoff 
Total 
Welfare 
Effort-Only 41.14  8.95  6.40  6.40  0.14  20.91  15.71  36.62 
 
(3.22) (0.31) (0.43) (0.43) (0.34) (3.11) (1.88) (1.91) 
Effort-Shock 33.45  7.63  4.69  4.62  -0.18 11.23  16.41  27.64 
 (2.98) (0.34) (0.34) (0.32) (0.22) (3.46) (2.49) (1.90) 
Outcome-Only 33.85  7.63  4.69  4.75  -0.50 12.04  17.63  29.67 
 
(2.28) (0.25) (0.41) (0.38) (0.13) (2.85) (1.89) (2.11) 
Standard errors in parenthesis are based on 9 independent observations. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Average Adjustment given Effort minus Desired Effort and Shock. 
  effort – desired effort 
  Negative Zero Positive 
Effort-Only -0.57 1.55 1.10 
N 235 105 20 
Effort-Shock -0.70 0.90 1.22 
N 252 62 46 
Negative Shock -1.11 1.00 0.71 
N 109 23 17 
Zero Shock -0.55 -0.13 1.50 
N 44 16 14 
Positive Shock -0.32 1.52 1.53 
N 99 23 15 
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Table 3: Panel Models of Adjustments. 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatments Effort-Only Effort-Shock Outcome-Only Effort-Shock Effort-Shock 
Dependent variable adjustment adjustment adjustment adjustment adjustment 
 wage -0.01* -0.01** -0.01 -0.01** -0.01** 
    [wage] (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
 effort – desired effort 0.38*** 0.23***  0.23***  
    [effort gap] (0.08) (0.05)  (0.05)  
 outcome – desired effort   0.21***  0.23*** 
    [outcome gap]   (0.06)  (0.05) 
 shock    0.23***  
    [random number]    (0.09)  
 period -1.12*** -0.45 -0.21 -0.51 -0.51 
    [inverse period] (0.49) (0.37) (0.58) (0.39) (0.39) 
 constant 2.01*** 0.96*** 0.38 1.01*** 1.00*** 
    [constant term] (0.82) (0.33) (0.58) (0.33) (0.33) 
 N 360 360 360 360 360 
 Clusters 9 9 9 9 9 
 Overall R-squared 0.18 0.1 0.08 0.12 0.12 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the group 
level and are calculated using a bootstrap method. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Panel Models of Effort. 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
Treatments Effort-Only Effort-Shock Outcome-Only 
Dependent variable Effort effort effort 
 wage 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
    [wage] (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 desired effort 0.11*** 0.08 0.05 
    [desired effort] (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
 period -0.91** 0.39 0.09 
    [inverse period] (0.43) (0.64) (0.50) 
 constant 1.93*** 1.52*** 2.21*** 
    [constant term] (0.60) (0.44) (0.42) 
 N 360 360 360 
 Clusters 9 9 9 
 Overall R-squared 0.43 0.25 0.18 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in 
parenthesis are clustered at the group level and are calculated using a bootstrap method. 
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Appendix A (Not for Publication): Instructions for the Effort-Shock Treatment 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make appropriate 
decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. 
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _10_ 
francs to _1_ dollar. You have already received a $20.00 participation fee (this includes your show-up fee of $7.00). 
Your earnings from the experiment will be incorporated into your participation fee. At the end of today’s 
experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. There are 24 participants are in today’s experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your 
cooperation. 
 
YOUR ROLE ASSIGNMENT 
The experiment consists of 10 decision-making periods. Each period, you will be randomly and 
anonymously placed into a group which consists of two participants: participant 1 and participant 2. At the 
beginning of the first period you will be randomly assigned either as participant 1 or participant 2. You will remain 
in the same role assignment throughout the entire experiment. So, if you are assigned as participant 2 then you will 
stay as participant 2 throughout the entire experiment. Each consecutive period you will be randomly re-grouped 
with another participant of opposite assignment. So, if you are participant 2, each period you will be randomly re-
grouped with another participant 1. 
 
STAGE 1 
Each period will proceed in three stages. In Stage 1, participant 1 will choose a reward (any integer 
number between 0 and 100) and a desired effort (any integer number between 0 and 14) for participant 2. An 
example of Stage 1decision screen for participant 1 is shown below. 
 
[Stage 1 decision screen] 
 
STAGE 2 
The computer will display to participant 2 the reward and the desired effort chosen by participant 1. Then 
in Stage 2, participant 2 will choose an effort level (any integer number between 0 and 14). An example of Stage 2 
decision screen for participant 2 is shown below. 
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[Stage 2 decision screen] 
For each effort level chosen by participant 2 there is an associated cost of effort. The cost of effort can be 
found in the following table: 
Effort 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
cost of effort 0 1 2 5 8 13 18 25 32 41 50 61 72 85 98 
Note that as effort rises from 0 to 14, costs rise exponentially. The cost of effort can be also calculated 
using the following formula (and rounding the number to the nearest highest integer): 
participant 2’s cost of effort = 
(effort)
2 
 
2 
 
STAGE 3 
After participant 2 chooses the effort level, the computer will add to effort a random number to determine 
the performance of participant 2: 
participant 2’s performance = effort + random number 
The random number chosen by the computer can take a value of -2, -1, 0, 1, or 2. Each number is equally 
likely to be drawn. After the computer makes a draw of a random number, it will display to participant 1 the 
performance of participant 2, as well as the effort chosen by participant 2 and the random number chosen by the 
computer. Then in the third stage, participants 1 will choose an adjustment level. The adjustment level can be any 
number, multiple of 10, between -50 and 50. An example of Stage 3 decision screen for participant 1 is shown 
below. 
 
[Stage 3 decision screen] 
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For each adjustment level chosen by participant 1 there is an associated cost of adjustment. The cost of 
adjustment can be found in the following table: 
adjustment -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 
cost of adjustment 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
EARNINGS OF PARTICIPANTS 1 AND 2 
The earnings of participant 1 depend on the reward chosen by participant 1 in the first stage, the 
performance of participant 2 in the second stage and the adjustment chosen by participant 1 in the third stage. 
Specifically, the participant 1’s earnings are calculated by the following formula: 
participant 1’s earnings = 10*(performance) – (reward) – (cost of adjustment) = 
= 10*(effort + random number) – (reward) – (cost of adjustment) 
Note that higher participant 2’s effort implies higher participant 2’s performance, and thus higher 
participant 1’s earnings. On the other hand, the higher reward or the higher cost of adjustment implies lower 
participant 1’s earnings. 
The earnings of participant 2 depend on the reward chosen by participant 1 in the first stage, the effort 
chosen by participant 2 in the second stage and the adjustment chosen by participant 1 in the third stage. 
Specifically, the participant 2’s earnings are calculated by the following formula: 
participant 2’s earnings = (reward) – (cost of effort) + (adjustment) 
Note that higher reward chosen by participant 1 implies higher participant 2’s earnings. On the other hand, 
the higher effort implies lower participant 2’s earnings. If participant 1 choses a positive adjustment level for 
participant 2 then participant 2’s earnings increase by that adjustment level. However, if participant 1 choses a 
negative adjustment level then participant 2’s earnings decrease by that adjustment level. 
 
Example 1 
Assume the following scenario. In the first stage, participant 1 chooses a reward of 50 and a desired effort 
of 7. In the second stage, participant 2 chooses an effort of 6. Then the computer randomly selects 2 as a random 
number, so the performance of participant 2 is 8 (6+2). Then the computer displays to participant 1 that participant 
2’s performance is 8, participant 2’s effort is 6 and the random number chosen by the computer is 2. After observing 
this information, in the third stage, participant 1 chooses an adjustment of -40. Therefore, participant 1’s earnings = 
10*8 – 50 – 4 = 26, since participant 2’s performance is 8, the reward is 50, and the cost of adjustment of -40 is 4. 
Finally, participant 2’s earnings = 50 – 18 – 40 = -8, since the reward is 50, the cost of effort of 6 is 18, and the 
adjustment is -40. 
 
Example 2 
Assume the following scenario. In the first stage, participant 1 chooses a reward of 40 and a desired effort 
of 6. In the second stage, participant 2 chooses an effort of 9. Then the computer randomly selects -2 as a random 
number, so the performance of participant 2 is 7 (9-2). Then the computer displays to participant 1 that participant 
2’s performance is 7, participant 2’s effort is 9 and the random number chosen by the computer is -2. After 
observing this information, in the third stage, participant 1 chooses an adjustment of 30. Therefore, participant 1’s 
earnings = 10*7 – 40 – 3 = 27, since participant 2’s performance is 7, the reward is 40, and the cost of adjustment of 
30 is 3. Finally, participant 2’s earnings = 40 – 41 + 30 = 29, since the reward is 40, the cost of effort of 9 is 41, and 
the adjustment is 30. 
 
END OF THE PERIOD 
At the end of each period, the computer will calculate individual earnings and display to both participants 
the following information: the reward chosen by participant 1, the desired effort chosen by participant 1, the 
performance of participant 2, the effort chosen by participant 2, the random number chosen by the computer, the 
adjustment chosen by participant 1, as well as individual earnings for that period. An example of the outcome screen 
is shown below. 
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[Outcome screen] 
 
Once your earnings are displayed on the outcome screen as shown below you should record your earnings 
for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
   
IMPORTANT NOTES 
Each period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group which consists of two 
participants: participant 1 and participant 2. At the beginning of the first period you will be randomly assigned 
either as participant 1 or participant 2. You will remain in the same role assignment throughout the entire 
experiment. So, if you are assigned as participant 2 then you will stay as participant 2 throughout the entire 
experiment. Each consecutive period you will be randomly re-grouped with the other participant of opposite 
assignment. So, if you are participant 2, each period you will be randomly re-grouped with another participant 1. 
Each period will proceed in three stages. In Stage 1, participant 1 will choose a reward and a desired 
effort for participant 2. The computer will display to participant 2 the reward and the desired effort chosen by 
participant 1. Then in Stage 2, participant 2 will choose an effort level. For each effort level chosen by participant 
2 there is an associated cost of effort. After participant 2 chooses the effort level, the computer will add to effort a 
random number to determine the performance of participant 2. Then the computer will display to participant 1 the 
performance of participant 2, as well as the effort chosen by participant 2 and the random number chosen by the 
computer. Then in Stage 3, participant 1 will choose an adjustment level. Finally, at the end of each period, the 
computer will calculate individual earnings and display both participants all relevant information. 
Remember you have already received a $20.00 participation fee. In the experiment, depending on a period, 
you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the experiment we will randomly select 1 out of 
10 periods for actual payment and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. If the earnings are negative, we will 
subtract them from your total earnings. If the earnings are positive, we will add them to your total earnings.  
Are there any questions? 
 
Cost of Effort Table 
For each effort level chosen by participant 2 there is an associated cost of effort. 
effort 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
cost of effort 0 1 2 5 8 13 18 25 32 41 50 61 72 85 98 
 
Cost of Adjustment Table 
For each adjustment level chosen by participant 1 there is an associated cost of adjustment. 
adjustment -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 
cost of adjustment 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix B (Not for Publication): IR/IC Contracts 
The analysis in Section 4 is based on all contracts. Here, we focus on the IR/IC contracts. The 
majority of contracts observed in our experiment satisfy IR/IC (62%). The number of contracts satisfying 
IR/IC is very similar across the three treatments (64% in Effort-Only, 59% in Outcome-Only and 62% in 
Effort-Shock). Table B1 provides the summary statistics across all three treatments.  
When examining adjustments in stage 3, we find no significant difference between treatments: 
Effort-Only versus Outcome-Only (0.26 versus -0.62; p-value = 0.11, n1 = 9, n2 = 9), Effort-Only versus 
Effort-Shock (0.26 versus -0.51; p-value = 0.20, n1 = 9, n2 = 9), and Outcome-Only versus Effort-Shock (-
0.62 versus -0.51; p-value = 0.96, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). 
When examining effort in stage 2, we find that the average unconditional effort in the Effort-Only 
treatment is higher than in the Outcome-Only treatment (6.86 versus 5.08; p-value < 0.01, n1 = 9, n2 = 9) 
and the Effort-Shock treatment (6.86 versus 5.07; p-value < 0.01, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). On the other hand, the 
average effort is not different between the Outcome-Only and Effort-Shock treatments (5.08 versus 5.07; 
p-value = 0.99, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). When examining the probability of effort exceeding the desired effort, we 
find that it is significantly lower in the Effort-Only treatment than in the Outcome-Only treatment (0.07 
versus 0.19; p-value = 0.03, n1 = 9, n2 = 9), but there is no significant difference between the Effort-Only 
and Effort-Shock treatments (0.07 versus 0.14; p-value = 0.28, n1 = 9, n2 = 9) or between the Outcome-
Only and Effort-Shock treatments (0.19 versus 0.14; p-value = 0.59, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). When examining the 
probability of agents choosing efforts exactly specified by the contract, we find that it is significantly 
higher in the Effort-Only treatment than in the Outcome-Only treatment (0.41 versus 0.12; p-value < 0.01, 
n1 = 9, n2 = 9) and the Effort-Shock treatment (0.41 versus 0.23; p-value = 0.03, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). There is 
no difference between the Outcome-Only and Effort-Shock treatments (0.12 versus 0.23; p-value = 0.10, 
n1 = 9, n2 = 9), although the difference nears statistical significance. 
When examining wage and desired effort in stage 1, we find that they are the highest in the 
Effort-Only treatment. The average wage in the Effort-Only treatment is significantly higher than in the 
Effort-Shock treatment (46.27 versus 38.87; p-value = 0.05, n1 = 9, n2 = 9) and Outcome-Only treatment 
(46.27 versus 37.36; p-value = 0.02, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). Similarly, the average desired effort is higher in the 
Effort-Only treatment than in the Effort-Shock treatment (8.13 versus 6.91; p-value < 0.01, n1 = 9, n2 = 9) 
and the Outcome-Only treatment (8.13 versus 6.65; p-value < 0.01, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). On the other hand, 
wage and desired effort are not different between the Outcome-Only and Effort-Shock treatments (p-
values = 0.89 and 0.63, respectively). As a consequence of higher wage and higher effort, the Effort-Only 
treatment generates significantly higher payoff to the principal than the Outcome-Only treatment (20.39 
versus 9.17; p-value = 0.03, n1 = 9, n2 = 9) and the Effort-Shock treatment (20.39 versus 12.09; p-value = 
36 
 
0.05, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). Yet, the principal’s payoff is not significantly different between the Outcome-Only 
and Effort-Shock treatments (9.17 versus 12.09; p-value = 0.57, n1 = 9, n2 = 9). When comparing payoffs 
of agents, we find no significant differences between the three treatments (all p-values > 0.45). 
 
Table B1: Summary Statistics: IR/IC Contracts. 
Treatment Wage 
Desired 
Effort Effort Outcome Adjustment 
Principal's 
Payoff 
Agent's 
Payoff 
Total 
Welfare 
Effort-Only 46.27 8.13 6.86 6.86 0.26 20.39 18.91 39.30 
 
(2.57) (0.24) (0.34) (0.34) (0.38) (2.89) (1.68) (1.48) 
Effort-Shock 38.87 6.91 5.07 4.98 -0.51 9.17 20.27 29.44 
  (2.56) (0.33) (0.30) (0.33) (0.27) (3.75) (2.06) (2.19) 
Outcome-Only 37.36 6.65 5.08 5.12 -0.62 12.09 19.50 31.58 
 
(2.06) (0.34) (0.49) (0.48) (0.24) (3.65) (2.10) (2.33) 
Standard errors in parenthesis (based on 9 independent observations).  
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Appendix C (Not for Publication): Non-IR/IC Contracts 
The analysis in Section 4 is based on all contracts. Here, we focus on the non-IR/IC contracts. 
Examining the non-IR/IC contracts, we find that 36% of contracts in the Effort-Only, 41% in the 
Outcome-Only and 38% in the Effort-Shock treatment can be characterized as non-IR/IC contracts. The 
vast majority of the non-IR/IC contracts (91%, 744 out of 822) are the ones where, conditional on 
contract being exactly fulfilled, the agent is expected to receive a negative payoff (i.e., w – c(e) < 0). We 
refer to these contracts as the “stingy” contracts, since they do not satisfy the incentive compatibility 
requirements for the agent. The rest of the non-IR/IC contracts (9%, 78 out of 822) are the ones where the 
principal is expected to receive a negative payoff (i.e., 10e – w < 0). We refer to these contacts as the 
“generous” contacts, since in such contracts the principal offers very generous wages relatively to the 
desired effort, although they are not individually rational. Table C1 provides the summary statistics across 
all three treatments, using “stingy” contracts (top part) and “generous” contracts (bottom part).  
Examining first the 78 generous contracts where the principal is expected to make a negative 
payoff (the bottom panel of Table C1), we find that principals make negative payoffs in all three 
treatments. Due to the small number of such contracts there are only 5 independent observations in the 
Effort-Only treatment, 4 in the Effort-Shock treatment, and 6 in the Outcome-Only treatment. Although a 
full statistical analysis is not appropriate with such a small (and very noisy) number of independent 
observations, it appears that when the principals offer “generous” contracts, the agents reciprocate. The 
effort is about 2 units higher than the desired effort, which is in sharp contrast to the IR/IC contacts in 
Table 1. However, this reciprocation by agents is not nearly enough to compensate for very generous 
wage offers by principals. As a consequence, principals make negative payoffs, while agents make 
positive and very high payoffs. It is important to emphasize that such behavior by principals is unlikely to 
be caused by mistakes. The 78 generous contracts are offered by 52 independent subjects. Moreover 34 of 
these contacts are offered in the last five periods of the experiment. A possible explanation for generous 
contracts is that principals use such contracts hoping that agents will show significant reciprocity. While 
we cannot rule out the possibility that generous contracts are caused by mistakes (although it is unlikely), 
we can rule out the possibility that these contracts offer “efficiency wages” – aimed at keeping agents 
happy in the long-run – since relationships are one-shot. 
When examining the 744 stingy contracts where the agent is expected to make a negative payoff 
(the top panel of Table C1), we find that in all three treatments agents make significantly positive payoffs 
(based on the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, separately for each treatment, all p-values are less than 0.01). 
This is mainly because the effort is about 5-6 units below the desired effort (which is in sharp contrast to 
the generous contracts in Table C1 and the IR/IC contacts in Table 1). Interestingly, on average, 
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principals do not punish such behavior. One reason for this is that principals make very substantial 
payoffs even when agents do not fully fulfill the terms of the stingy contract. In fact, the principals 
offering stingy contracts on average receive very similar payoffs than the principals offering IR/IC 
contracts (based on the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, separately for each treatment, all p-values are greater 
than 0.20). Agents, on the other hand, receive significantly lower payoffs under the stingy contracts than 
under the IR/IC contracts (based on the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, separately for each treatment, all p-
values are less than 0.02). These two findings can explain why the majority of contracts satisfy IR/IC, yet 
some principals still choose to offer stingy contracts. On the one hand, principals should be indifferent 
between offering the IR/IC and stingy contracts, since the expected payoff is not different between the 
two. So, we should observe both types of the contacts. On the other hand, IR/IC contracts provide 
significantly higher payoffs to the agents, and thus benevolent principals should choose the IR/IC 
contracts more often than the stingy contracts. 
 
Table C1: Summary Statistics: Non-IR/IC Contracts. 
Treatment Wage 
Desired 
Effort Effort Outcome Adjustment 
Principal's 
Payoff 
Agent's 
Payoff 
Total 
Welfare 
Stingy Contracts  
Effort-Only 30.31 10.68 5.35 5.35 -0.08 21.23 9.42 30.64 
 
(3.94) (0.51) (0.75) (0.75) (0.41) (4.96) (2.37) (3.45) 
Effort-Shock 23.00 9.12 3.83 3.66 0.22 12.44 9.49 21.93 
  (3.92) (0.47) (0.50) (0.49) (0.31) (4.17) (3.05) (3.04) 
Outcome-Only 21.21 10.38 4.00 4.09 -0.50 18.23 7.62 25.85 
 
(4.03) (0.51) (0.56) (0.53) (0.30) (3.95) (3.02) (3.24) 
Generous Contacts 
Effort-Only 54.00 2.20 4.00 4.00 -2.00 -16.00 42.00 26.00 
 
(8.27) (0.80) (0.95) (0.95) (1.22) (11.53) (9.82) (4.16) 
Effort-Shock 44.88 1.88 3.44 4.19 -0.94 -4.06 36.50 32.44 
  (6.71) (0.72) (0.86) (1.12) (0.60) (8.06) (5.30) (9.80) 
Outcome-Only 57.47 2.96 5.44 5.61 0.44 -3.07 35.38 32.31 
 
(6.46) (0.33) (0.88) (1.02) (0.60) (13.62) (11.62) (3.83) 
Standard errors in parenthesis (based on 9 independent observations). In the bottom panel of the table there are only 
5 independent observations in the Effort-Only treatment, 4 in the Effort-Shock treatment, and 6 in the Outcome-
Only treatment.   
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Appendix D (Not for Publication): Non-IR/IC Contracts 
Table D1 shows the estimation results of different panel models where individual subjects 
represent the random effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the single re-matching group level. 
The dependent variable in all specifications is the adjustment and the independent variables are an inverse 
of period, wage, effort – desired effort (in Effort-Only and Effort-Shock) and outcome – desired effort (in 
Outcome-Only), as well as treatment dummies. All regressions indicate no significant difference in 
adjustment level between the three treatments (see the treatment dummies). 
 
Table D1: Panel Models of Adjustments. 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
Treatments 
Effort-Only & 
Effort-Shock 
Effort-Only & 
Outcome-Only 
Effort-Shock & 
Outcome-Only 
Dependent variable adjustment adjustment adjustment 
 Effort-Only 0.28 0.62  
    [Effort-Only treatment dummy] (0.42) (0.41)  
 Outcome-Only   -0.34 
    [Outcome-Only treatment dummy]   (0.25) 
 wage -0.01** -0.01 -0.01** 
    [wage] (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 effort – desired effort 0.30***   
    [effort gap] (0.05)   
 outcome – desired effort  0.28*** 0.22*** 
    [outcome gap]  (0.05) (0.04) 
 period -0.81*** -0.69* -0.36 
    [inverse period] (0.30) (0.41) (0.32) 
 constant 1.24*** 0.80* 0.87*** 
    [constant term] (0.37) (0.44) (0.32) 
 N 720 720 720 
 Clusters 18 18 18 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis 
are clustered at the group level. 
 
Table D2 shows the estimation results of different panel models where individual subjects 
represent the random effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the single re-matching group level. 
The dependent variable in all specifications is the effort and the independent variables are an inverse of 
period, wage, and desired effort, as well as treatment dummies. The regression results corroborate our 
main findings (see the treatment dummies): effort is greater in Effort-Only than in the other two 
treatments, but there is no difference between Effort-Shock and Outcome-Only treatments. 
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Table D2: Panel Models of Effort. 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
Treatments 
Effort-Only & 
Effort-Shock 
Effort-Only & 
Outcome-Only 
Effort-Shock & 
Outcome-Only 
Dependent variable effort effort effort 
 Effort-Only 0.95** 1.03**  
    [Effort-Only treatment dummy] (0.41) (0.49)  
 Outcome-Only   -0.03 
    [Outcome-Only treatment dummy]   (0.39) 
 wage 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 
    [wage] (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 desired effort 0.09** 0.09** 0.07 
    [desired effort] (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
 period -0.30 -0.43 0.26 
    [inverse period] (0.40) (0.32) (0.42) 
 constant 1.30*** 1.49*** 1.82*** 
    [constant term] (0.37) (0.45) (0.42) 
 N 720 720 720 
 Clusters 18 18 18 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis 
are clustered at the group level. 
 
Table D3 shows the estimation results of different panel models where individual subjects 
represent the random effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the single re-matching group level. 
The dependent variable in all specifications is the wage and the independent variables are an inverse of 
period, and treatment dummies. The regression results corroborate our main findings (see the treatment 
dummies): wage is greater in Effort-Only than in the other two treatments, but there is no difference 
between Effort-Shock and Outcome-Only treatments. 
 
Table D3: Panel Models of Wage. 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
Treatments 
Effort-Only & 
Effort-Shock 
Effort-Only & 
Outcome-Only 
Effort-Shock & 
Outcome-Only 
Dependent variable wage wage wage 
 Effort-Only 7.69* 7.29*  
    [Effort-Only treatment dummy] (4.26) (3.83)  
 Outcome-Only   0.40 
    [Outcome-Only treatment dummy]   (3.65) 
 period -0.40 -2.04 2.24 
    [inverse period] (3.12) (3.09) (3.45) 
 constant 33.57*** 34.45*** 32.80*** 
    [constant term] (3.43) (2.92) (3.46) 
 N 720 720 720 
 Clusters 18 18 18 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis 
are clustered at the group level. 
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Table D4 shows the estimation results of different panel models where individual subjects 
represent the random effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the single re-matching group level. 
The dependent variable in all specifications is the desired effort and the independent variables are an 
inverse of period, and treatment dummies. The regression results corroborate our main findings (see the 
treatment dummies): wage is greater in Effort-Only than in the other two treatments, but there is no 
difference between Effort-Shock and Outcome-Only treatments. 
 
Table D4: Panel Models of Desired Effort. 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
Treatments 
Effort-Only & 
Effort-Shock 
Effort-Only & 
Outcome-Only 
Effort-Shock & 
Outcome-Only 
Dependent variable desired effort desired effort desired effort 
 Effort-Only 1.31*** 1.32***  
    [Effort-Only treatment dummy] (0.44) (0.38)  
 Outcome-Only   -0.01 
    [Outcome-Only treatment dummy]   (0.41) 
 period -1.46*** -1.57** -1.11* 
    [inverse period] (0.54) (0.70) (0.60) 
 constant 8.06*** 8.09*** 7.96*** 
    [constant term] (0.41) (0.38) (0.42) 
 N 720 720 720 
 Clusters 18 18 18 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis 
are clustered at the group level. 
 
